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PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE BEETLE
INTHEBOXt
WENDY CoLLINs PERDuE*

Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it
a "beetle." No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone
says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.H ere it would be quite possible for everyone to have something
different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.-But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in
these people's language?-If so it would not be used as the name
of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the languagegame at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be
empty. 1
INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, the United States Supreme Court has
been particularly interested in personal jurisdiction questions. 2 Det Copyright© 1991 Wendy Collins Perdue.

*

Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., Wellesley College, 1975; J.D., Duke University, 1978. I would like to thank Mark Tushnet, Wendy Williams
and the participants at the Georgetown Faculty Research Seminar for their helpful comments
and suggestions.
1 L. WriTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 293 (G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. 3d
ed. 1958).
2 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, llO S. Ct. 2105 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
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spite its apparent interest in the subject, the Court has been unable
to develop a coherent doctrine. The result has been that every few
years, the Court's description of personal jurisdiction is inconsistent
with its recent prior precedent.
In 1980 in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woods-on, the Supreme
Court described personal jurisdiction as "an instrument of interstate
federalism." 3 Two years later in Insurance Corporation of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, the Court back-pedaled and explained that personal jurisdiction "represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."4 Then, in 1985 in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, the
Court explained that the purpose of personal jurisdiction is "to
protect a defendant from the travail of defending in a distant
forum." 5 Three years later in Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, the Court
stated that personal jurisdiction does not entail a right to be protected from the burdens of trial, but entails only a right not to be
"subject to the binding judgments" of particular places. 6 ·
The Court's struggle in the area of personal jurisdiction has
reached the point that the Court is now having difficulty generating
majority opinions. In its two most recent personal jurisdiction cases,
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court7 and Burnham v. Superior
Court8 the Court was unanimous in its conclusion, but deeply fragmented in its rationale.
The reason for the Court's difficulty in this area appears to be
that personal jurisdiction is really a solution in search of a problem.
Although the Court has thought "the problem" to be sufficiently
important to warrant its hearing thirteen personal jurisdiction cases
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In january 1991, the Supreme Court heard oral argument
in yet another personal jurisdiction case, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 897 F.2d 377
(9th Cir.), cert. granted, ll1 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
3 444 u.s. 286, 294 (1980).
4 456 u.s. 694, 702 (1982).
5 472 u.s. 797, 807 (1985).
6 486 U.S. 517, 525 (1988). Van Cauwenberghe highlights a collateral but revealing issue
involving personal jurisdiction-the issue of whether a refusal to dismiss a case for lack of
jurisdiction is immediately appealable in federal court. Id. at 518-19. If personal jurisdiction
is a kind of personal immunity that protects citizens from the processes of unrelated sovereigns or prevents the undue burdens of litigation in distant fora, this interest could not be
vindicated except by allowing an immediate appeal. Nonetheless, in Van Cauwenberght!, the
Court suggested almost offhandedly that immediate appeals would not be allowed in such
cases. See id. at 526-27.
7 480 u.s. 102 (1987).
8 llO S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
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in the past fourteen years, it has never explicitly defined the problem. To use the metaphor of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Court seems
to assume that we all know the characteristics of the beetle in the
box of personal jurisdiction. Yet, because the Court has never actually described the "beetle," it seems subject to infinite change.
The plurality opinions in the recent Burnham case highlight this
problem. In Burnham, the Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of "transient" jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction based solely
on the fact that the defendant was served with process while present
in the forum state. 9 Justices Brennan and Scalia, each writing for
separate pluralities, agreed that personal jurisdiction is controlled
by "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 10 Rather
than defining these notions, however, they focused on the extent to
which these notions are subject to change. 11
Justice Brennan insisted that the relevant fairness principles
evolve over time. 12 Yet, he also concluded that transient jurisdiction
is still valid. 13 It is unclear whether Justice Brennan believes the
principles of fairness that he used to analyze transient jurisdiction
are newly evolved ones that happen to yield the same result as the
old principles, or whether he believes that, although the principles
generally evolve, the principles relevant to this case have not
changed.
Justice Scalia's opinion is troubling for a different reason. Justice Scalia argued that Justice Brennan's approach would allow the
Court to compel states to change long-established practices based
on "no authority other than individual Justices' perceptions of fairness."14 In order to prevent this standardless intrusion into state
autonomy, Justice Scalia argued that the Court must rely on "tradition," namely, what was accepted practice in 1868 at the time of
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. 15 Yet, Justice Scalia's
opinion itself acknowledges that within a few decades of 1868, the
Court began expanding jurisdiction beyond its "traditional" limits. 16
9 Id. at 2119 (Scalia,J.); id. at 2119-20 (White,]., concurring); id. at 2126 (Brennan,].,
concurring); id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
10 See id. at 2114 (Scalia, J.); id. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
11 Thus, Burnham is largely a continuation of the Supreme Court's debate concerning
the proper methodology to be used in evaluating substantive due process claims. See, e.g.,
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341-46 (1989).
12 Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120-22 (Brennan,]., concurring).
13 Id. at 2124-26.
HId. at 2117-19 (Scalia,].).
15 Jd.at2111.
1s Id. at 2113-15.
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Thus, according to Justice Scalia's own opinion, it seems that in the
area of personal jurisdiction it is not traditional to limit personal
jurisdiction to its traditional limits. 17
Ultimately, the dialogue between Justices Brennan and Scalia
does little to illuminate personal jurisdiction. To return to the metaphor of the beetle in the box, Justice Brennan has looked in his
box and announced that his personal jurisdiction beetle is evolving,
though the particular part of the beetle in question has not changed.
Justice Scalia has looked in his box and announced that his beetle
cannot change, though he notes that another part of the beetle, not
relevant to this case, has changed in the past.
Until we finally identify the underlying problem for which
personal jurisdiction is the solution, the doctrinal muddle will persist. Yet, it is not obvious what problem personal jurisdiction solves.
One might argue that personal jurisdiction is simply a guaranty of
immunity from the inconvenience of distant litigation. 18 The doc17 As Justice Scalia acknowledges, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), presents a
particularly strong counterargument to his assertion that the relevant test is tradition. In
Shaffer, the Court struck down quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, a type of jurisdiction that had
historically been permitted in the United States. Id. at 216-17. In order to reconcile Shaffer
with his analysis, Justice Scalia suggested that the practice at issue in that case was "engaged
in by only a very small minority of the States," 110 S. Ct. at 2116 (footnote omitted), noting
that the case involved attachment of stock in Delaware and Delaware was "the only State that
treated the place of incorporation as the situs of corporate stock when both the owner and
custodian were elsewhere." I d. at 2116 n.4. This characterization of the holding in Shaffer is
consistent with Justice Scalia's argument in Michael H. that in looking to tradition "[w]e refer
to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to,
the asserted right can be identified." 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6.
Justice Scalia's attempt to limit Shaffer in this way is troubling for several reasons. First,
although Delaware may have been unique in its treatment of stock, it cannot be said that
there was a traditional right to be free from state exercises of power on this basis. Instead,
it seems more accurate to say that there was simply no tradition in this specific area. Thus,
under Justice Scalia's own methodology it is necessary to consult the next more general level
of tradition. See id. A logical next level of generality would be to inquire whether there is a
traditional right to be free from jurisdiction based on the presence of intangible property.
At this level of generality, there is a tradition, that is, jurisdiction was traditionally permitted
on this basis. Maybe there is some interim level of generality that explains Shaffer's result,
but Justice Scalia does not identify it.
A less theoretical objection to Scalia's characterization of Shaffer is that he seems to be
arguing that Shaffer did not invalidate all or even most assertions of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction-it only invalidated the attempt to get jurisdiction based on the fictitious presence of
stock. This extraordinarily narrow reading of Shaffer is at odds with the language of the case
itself which did not discuss the situs of intangibles and drew no distinction between suits
concerned by the seizure of intangible versus tangible property. See Lowenfeld, In Search of
the Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 102, 110-15 (1978).
18 See Lewis, Tile "Forum State Interest" Factor in Personal jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-
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trine that has developed, however, does not focus on such a guaranty.19 Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that personal jurisdiction serves some other purpose. 20 Limitations of
personal jurisdiction could be intended to protect a defendant from
the bias of states with which she is not affiliated. Again, however,
the developed doctrine is not addressed to bias. 21 Moreover, neither
inconvenience nor the bias theories explains why we should be more
concerned with inconvenience and bias suffered by defendants than
that suffered by plaintiffs. 22
Some commentators have attempted to describe in some detail
the problem for which personal jurisdiction is the solution. 23 They
have suggested two related problems for which personal jurisdiction
is supposedly the solution. The first of these perceived problems is
derived from a central concern of political philosophy, that is, when
may a state legitimately exercise coercive power?24 The second perCourt Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REv. 769, 771 (1982); Redish, Due
Process, Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112,
1133-34 (1981); Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts:
Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REv. 485, 522-27 (1984).
19 See Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
1291, 1303-12 (1983); Maltz, Reflections on a Landmark: Shaffer v. Heitner Viewed from a
Distance, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1043, 1058-59; Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process:
Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REv. 479, 509-10 (1987); Stein,
Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REv.
689, 708 (1987).
20 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (restrictions on personal jurisdiction
"more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient ... litigation"), quoted in WorldWide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Abrams, Power, Convenience, and
the Elimination ofPersonal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1982); Redish,
supra note 18, at 1117-18, 1137. But see Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue
for State and Federal Courts, 66 CoRNELL L. REv. 411,416 (1981) (suggesting that the minimum
contacts test is a rule of thumb .for estimating convenience and reasonableness); Lewis, The
Three Deaths of"State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal
Jurisdiction, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 709 (1983) (same).
21 There is no reason to believe states would be less biased against a defendant with
"minimum contacts" than defendants with no contacts with the state. See Gottlieb, supra note
19, at 1302.
22 See Perdue, supra note 19, at 517-18.
23 See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,
1980 SuP. CT. REv. 77, 86-87 [hereinafter How Contacts Count]; Brilmayer,Jurisdictional Due
Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 293, 294 (1987) [hereinafter Political Theory];
Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a Political Philosophy of Interstate
Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 389, 391 (1987) [hereinafter Shaping & Sharing]; Stewart, A
New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. Cow. L. REv. 5, 19 (1989); Trangsrud, The Federal
Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 849, 884-85 (1989); Weisburd,
Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WAsH. U.L.Q. 377, 378 (1985).
24 See infra notes 29-109 and accompanying text.
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ceived problem reflects commerce clause-related concerns about
burdening and discriminating against outsiders who are not represented in the state's political process. 25
Some of the personal jurisdiction cases do in fact suggest that
these two supposed problems are the ones the Supreme Court is
attempting to solve. Unfortunately, neither is a satisfactory foundation for personal jurisdiction doctrine. Indeed, the linking of
personaljurisdiction to these supposed problems has compounded,
not reduced, doctrinal difficulties. Moreover, proponents of this
approach have generally relied on theories of political legitimacy
that are both misleading and troubling.
This article analyzes and criticizes these two problems supposedly solved by personal jurisdiction. Section I describes the problem
of politicallegitimacy26 and Section II examines a commerce clause
analogy as another justification for constitutional limits on state
adjudicatory authority. 27 Section III then examines several alternative problems for which personal jurisdiction may be the solution. 28 These problems are practical ones and reflect the premise
that personal jurisdiction may be nothing more than what actual
litigants have always thought it was, namely, a doctrine to limit a
plaintiff's choices of possible fora.
l.

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

The United States Supreme Court case of Insurance Corporation
of Ireland29 contains the clearest articulation of the supposed problem for which personal jurisdiction doctrine is the solution. In that
case, the Court rejected earlier suggestions that personal jurisdiction
was a doctrine designed to preserve federalism. 30 The Court explained that the personal jurisdiction requirement "represents a
restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as
a matter of individual liberty."31 In a footnote, the Court further
explained that "[t]he restriction on state sovereign power described

See infra notes 110-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 29-109 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 110-63 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 164-227 and accompanying text.
29 456 u.s. 694 (1982).
so I d. at 702-03; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 29394 (1980).
51 Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702.
25

26
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in [an earlier case] ... must be seen as ultimately a function of the
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause." 32
This description of the relationship between the due process
clause and personal jurisdiction suggests that personal jurisdiction
is a substantive due process right. 33 Apparently, the defendant's
liberty is taken when she is subjected to jurisdiction in a forum with
which she lacks the requisite connection. Yet, the Court has never
explained why being subject to jurisdiction is a taking of liberty, at
least where the defendant has had notice and a full opportunity to
defend.
Commentators have begun to provide the explanation, arguing
that personal jurisdiction is a concrete manifestation of the problem
of political obligation and legitimacy. The most prominent spokesperson for this view is Lea Brilmayer, who has forcefully argued
that a theory of personal jurisdiction must be based on a political
theory about the circumstances under which government may legitimately exercise coercive power. 34 Other commentators have implicitly and explicitly adopted this view. 35
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly linked personal jurisdiction to the philosophical problem of political legitimacy, this theory of personal jurisdiction helps to explain the link
between personal jurisdiction and the due process clause. Whenever
a government acts in excess of its legitimate authority, one can view
that action as a taking of liberty. Personal jurisdiction doctrine can
be understood, therefore, as an attempt to delineate the scope of
one aspect of legitimate state authority.36
Having conceived of personal jurisdiction doctrine as concerning the scope of legitimate state power, some commentators argue
that that doctrine does and should incorporate philosophical theories about the legitimate scope of governmental power. 37 Indeed,
although the cases do not frame the discussion in terms of political

Id. at 702-03 n.lO (referring to World-Wide Volkswagen).
See Perdue, supra note 19, at 508-09.
54 See Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 294; Brilmayer, Shaping & Sharing,
supra note 23, at 391.
55 See Stewart, supra note 23, at 19; Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 884-85; Weisburd,
supra note 23, at 378.
56 See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart,]., dissenting) (arguing that
personal jurisdiction concerns the relationship between the defendant and "the sovereign
that created the court" and whether that sovereign has power over the defendant).
57 See, e.g., Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 294; Brilmayer, Shaping & Sharing,
supra note 23, at 391; Stewart, supra note 23, at 19; Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 884-85.
52
55
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philosophy, the basic approach seems to fall within a well-established
philosophical tradition.
This basic approach is apparent in Asahi. 38 Notwithstanding the
division of the Court in that case, the Justices agreed that '"the
constitutional touchstone' of the determination whether an exercise
of personal jurisdiction comports with due process 'remains whether
the defendant purposefully established "minimum contacts" in the
forum State."'39 The Court has repeatedly stressed the requirement
that the defendant have purposefully affiliated herself in some way
with the forum. 40 The whole concept of "purposeful availment"
syems to embody the notion of consent41 and falls squarely within
the social contract philosophical tradition. 42
Although grounding personal jurisdiction in a social contract
theory of political legitimacy has its critics, it is attracting a growing
list of supporters. Linking personal jurisdiction with consent seems
benign and consistent with basic democratic values and with a goal
of enhancing individual autonomy. Closer examination reveals that
it is seriously problematic.
A. Critique of Consent as a justification for State judicial Power

The concept that legitim~te government power derives only
from the voluntary consent of the governed is deeply rooted in our
political history. This concept is reflected in the Declaration of
Independence, the Preamble of the Constitution, and a number of
38 The Court was divided on whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the
forum, although eight justices agreed that jurisdiction was unreasonably burdensome under
the facts of the case. See Maltz, Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal jurisdiction: A
Comment on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DuKE L.J. 669,
683.
.
39 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1987)
(O'Connor, J.) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudezwicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)). See
Maltz, supra note 19, at 1059-60, 1066; Stewart, supra note 23, at 6.
40 See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 291, 294-95 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91-94 (1978);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203-04, 216-17 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958).
41 See Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 306; Maltz, supra note 19, at 1060;
Stein, supra note 19, at 708 n.91; Stewart, supra note 23, at 19; Weber, Purposeful Availment,
39 S.C.L. REv. 815, 832 (1988). Professor Stein notes that "the current trend in jurisdictional
discussions attempts to use some form of consent as the sole legitimating factor." Stein, supra
note 19, at 708 n.91.
42 See Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 307; Brilmayer, Shaping & Sharing,
supra note 34, at 411-12; Maltz, supra note 20, at 1060; Stewart, supra note 23, at 19;
Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 889.
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early state constitutions. 43 All consent theories share a common core
"which maintains that the political obligations of citizens are
grounded in their personal performance of a voluntary act which
is the deliberate undertaking of an obligation."44 These theories,
which are premised on a belief in individual autonomy, 45 have great
intuitive appeal.
Notwithstanding their appeal, consent theories have significant
flaws as a basis for political obligation. The major difficulties stem
from the fact that, although explicit consent may be a relatively
uncontroversial basis for establishing political legitimacy, explicit
consent simply does not occur all that frequently. Thus, any reasonably inclusive consent theory of political legitimacy must rely on
some form of tacit consent. Tacit consent provides the real quagmire
for consent theory.
There are two categories of tacit consent. 46 First, tacit consent
occurs when there is an actual knowing and voluntary acceptance
of obligations, but the acceptance is communicated through conduct
or even silence. A major difficulty with this type of consent is that
in order to determine the scope of that consent, and whether, in
fact, consent occurred, rules must be developed for interpreting or
delineating the significance of the citizen's conduct.47 This interpretation can occur only against a set of well understood background
conditions. 48 The interpretation of conduct will be particularly difficult where consent includes the possibility of limited consent, that
is, consent to some but not all exercises of authority. Nonetheless,
some version of limited consent is essential if consent theory is to
explain modern personal jurisdiction doctrine.
A central component of such doctrine is the distinction between
specific and general jurisdiction.49 Some types of conduct are con4S See J.W. GouGH, THE SociAL CONTRACT 230-31 (2d ed. 1957). The American version
of this philosophy is most closely identified with John Locke, but variations are reflected in
a wide range of modem philosophers as well as legal commentators. See, e.g., J. RAwLS, A
THEORY OF jUSTICE (1971); D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); P.
SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT (1985).
« A.j. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 57 (1979).
45 See id. at 69.
46 See generaUy id. at 88-90.
47 See Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1, 6 (1989) [hereinafter
Consent & Contract]; Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1301.
48 Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REv. 79, 92-94 (1981). As
Professor Murphy has observed: "Thus, even in the best of tacit consent cases, the ice is thin.
When the normal background conditions are lacking, there is no ice at all." Id. at 93.
4 9 The terminology derives from von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1136-45 (1966). See Helicopteros Nacionales de
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sidered sufficient to subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction on
any suit; other conduct subjects the defendant to jurisdiction on
only a particular type of suit. To translate this distinction into the
language of consent, some conduct indicates consent to a broad
range of government authority; other conduct reflects consent to
limited government authority. Given the wide range of obligations
that a person might accept by her conduct, it will be very difficult
to know with any confidence what was in fact intended by that
conduct.
Assuming it is possible to develop rules for interpreting conduct, another problem remains. There is little reason to believe that
this type of actual consent, which is merely tacitly communicated,
occurs much more frequently than explicit consent. 50 Thus, it becomes necessary to resort to a different type of tacit consent.
The second type of tacit consent does not focus on whether the
citizen in fact voluntarily accepted an obligation. Instead, the question is whether the citizen has engaged in some voluntary conduct
that creates an obligation. The critical difference is that with this
second type of "consent," legitimacy does not depend on whether
the person has in fact voluntarily accepted the obligation. Instead,
regardless of what a person meant or intended, when people engage
in certain conduct, it is fair, appropriate, or legitimate to impose
obligations on them.
Some commentators criticize this type of tacit consent as not
being consent at all. 51 This critique, however, is not adequate, particularly in the area of personal jurisdiction. Proponents of the tacit
consent approach would argue that the name "tacit consent" is
Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8 & 9 (1984). See generally Brilmayer, Related
Contacts and Personal jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1444 (1988) [hereinafter Related Contacts];
Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neuwirth, & O'Brien, A General Look at General jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REv. 721 (1988) [hereinafter General jurisdiction]; Twitchell, The Myth of
General jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 610 (1988).
50 See AJ. SIMMONS, supra note 44, at 93.
51 See D. HuME, Of the Original Contract, in 2 EsSAYS AND TREATISES 268,281-82 (London
1770). Hume argues:
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave
his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from
day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a
man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master;
though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and
perish, the moment he leaves her.
Id. See also A.J. SIMMONS, supra note 44, at 83-84; Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1301; Murphy,
supra note 48, at 92; Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-!, 59 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 990, 995 (1965);
.stewart, supra note 35, at 17.
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misleading. Their position is simply that a state can legitimately
exercise authority only over those who have, through their conduct,
manifested a willing affiliation with the state. 52 "Consent" in the
sense of some actual agreement is not necessary for legitimacy, but
some form of voluntary affiliating conduct is required. 5 3 Cases and
commentators suggest different versions of this type of tacit consent. As discussed below, none is satisfactory.
1. Receipt of Benefits
Under one version of tacit consent, obligations arise from the
acceptance of benefits. Both Hart and Rawls have developed this
concept54 and the personal jurisdiction case law contains versions
of it as well.55
Most recently, Justice Brennan in his plurality opinion in Burnham appears to endorse this approach. 56 In finding that transient
jurisdiction is consistent with modern notions of due process, Justice
Brennan stressed the numerous benefits that a transient receives
simply by entering the forum state: "[h]is health and safety are
guaranteed by the State's police, fire, and emerging medical services; he is free to travel on the State's roads and waterways; he
likely enjoys the fruits of the State's economy as well."57
It is not clear whether Justice Brennan believes that the acceptance of these benefits is simply evidence of actual consent, albeit
tacitly communicated, or whether he is relying on a kind of quasicontract theory58 that regardless of intent, it is intrinsically fair to
extract the price of personal jurisdiction from those who accept

See Stewart, supra note 23, at 18-19; Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 890.
For this reason, even explicit denials of consent presumably would not be effective.
Those who accept tacit consent as the foundation for jurisdiction would surely say that an
Oregon citizen who sent a letter to the Secretary of State of California explicitly announcing
that he was withholding his consent to jurisdiction could nonetheless be sued in California
for damages that person caused when driving through California.
54 See Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights? 64 PHIL. REv. 175, 185 (Apr. 1955); Rawls,
Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAw AND PHILOSOPHY, at 10 (S. Hooked. 1964).
55 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
319 (1945); Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 302-25 and cases discussed therein.
56 Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2124-25 (1990) (Brennan, J. concurring).
57 Id. at 2125.
58 See A. CoRBIN, CoRBIN ON CoNTRACTS § 19, at 50 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAw OF CoNTRACTS§ 3A, at 12-15 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1970).
52
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benefits from the state. 59 If Justice Brennan means to use the benefits as evidence of consent, then he is relying on the first type of
tacit consent described earlier, and his argument suffers from all of
its difficulties. 60 In particular, it is virtually impossible to interpret
meaningfully the defendant's conduct. The mere fact that the defendant entered the state offers scant evidence that he in fact voluntarily accepted the burden of personal jurisdiction for any suit
that might be filed against him.
The benefits approach does not fare much better as a quasicontract theory. On a practical level, if the approach is to be effective, some method must exist for valuing and comparing benefits
and burdens. This problem is well illustrated by Justice Brennan's
opinion in Burnham. Justice Brennan asserts that the burden to a
transient of being subject to jurisdiction is "slight" and the benefits
provided by the state are "significant,"61 but he offers little to demonstrate the correctness of this assertion.
In at least some cases, the benefits of roads and protections
available to transients are surely not commensurate with the burdens of being subjected to jurisdiction. The voluntary presence of
the transient may be very brief; the state may not in fact be the
provider of many of the services listed by Justice Brennan, 62 and,
in some cases, the burden of distant litigation may be great. 63 I
believe Justice Scalia is correct when he observes that viewing tran59 See Stein, supra note 19, at 700 (noting that it is frequently difficult to tell whether
the Court means that '1urisdiction [is] fair because the exchange of benefits is evidence of a
voluntary affiliation, or because the exchange is substantively fair").
60 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of this type of tacit
consent and its difficulties.
6 1 Burnham, l1 0 S. Ct. at 2125 (Brennan, J ., concurring).
62 For example, police, fire, and emergency services may be provided by local govern·
ments.
63 See Stein, supra note 19, at 736. Justice Brennan enumerates a list of procedural
devices that, according to him, limit the burdens of distant litigation. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct.
at 2125 n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring). The devices he lists, however, will not always be
available or helpful. For example, dismissal or summary judgment will not be available where
there is a cognizable claim and a genuine dispute of fact. Similarly, although certain discovery
devices such telephone depositions may be available, these may also be less effective and,
moreover, none of these devices eliminates the difficulties that may be inherent in locating
and dealing with a lawyer who may be thousands of miles away. Most strikingly, the option
of a change of venue to a different state is only available in federal court, and hence is
irrelevant where it is a state that attempts to assert jurisdiction. Finally, the fact that some
suits might be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens is also completely irrelevant.
The problem of whether a state has authority to assert personal jurisdiction only arises if the
state attempts to exercise jurisdiction.

as
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sient jurisdiction as a contractual bargain, the rule is "unconscionabl[e]."64
Even assuming some basis exists for concluding that the benefits
to a transient are commensurate with the burdens of jurisdiction,
further complications remain. First, the benefits are not dependent
on the defendant having been served in the forum. Thus, if we
were to take this approach seriously, anyone who has ever been
present within a state should be subject to any suit in that state,
regardless of whether they were served there. 65 Moreover, even
· people who have never visited a state may benefit in the ways listed
by Justice Brennan. One need not enter a state to benefit from a
state's economy or its transportation system. 66
In ad.dition to these problems, a benefits analysis of state authority is incomplete. In the area of personal jurisdiction, situations
can arise in which the defendant has received no benefits but jurisdiction is nonetheless appropriate. Calder v. jones67 is the most obvious example. In Calder, the Florida writer of the defamatory
article about a California resident did not receive any meaningful
benefits from California (at least none beyond those received by all
employees of corporations doing business in California). Yet, the
Supreme Court unanimously upheld personal jurisdiction. 68 Many
other tort cases may similarly prove difficult to fit into the benefits
model.
The benefits approach also poses theoretical difficulties. As a
theory of governmental legitimacy, it is troubling. Even if we can
develop a standard for assessing whether benefits and burdens are
commensurate, it is deeply disturbing to suggest that as long as
government provides you with something of objective value (that
you may not want), it can legitimately extract something from you
(that you do not want to give up). 69
64

Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2117.
See id.
66 The annual fires in the West that do not respect state boundaries demonstrate that
one may benefit quite significantly by the fire services provided by another state.
67 465 u.s. 783 (1984).
68 /d. at 791.
69 Robert Nozick makes a similar point, arguing that "[o]ne cannot, whatever one's
purposes, just act so as to give people benefits and then demand (or seize) payment." R.
NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 95 (1974). John Simmons has noted that the Nozick
argument may be unpersuasive where the individual has affirmatively sought and not merely
passively received the benefits. JJ. SIMMONS, supra note 44, at 122-29. As Simmons has also
noted, however, most of the benefits provided by governments are public goods, or what he
65
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2. Voluntary Affiliation
Several commentators who have argued that personal jurisdiction should incorporate a consent theory of legitimacy have offered
another variation on tacit consent. They have argued that, although
consent in the form of actual agreement is not necessary to legitimacy, some form of voluntary "affiliating conduct" is required 70 in
order to protect the "right to remain unconnected to a sovereign." 71
By requiring voluntary affiliating conduct, we limit governmental
power in a way that reaffirms both the principal of individual autonomy and the notion that governmental legitimacy derives from
the people.
In order to use this approach to explain personal jurisdiction
doctrine, rules must be developed that delineate what voluntary
actions are "sufficiently affiliating" to legitimate the exercise of
power. The rules for inferring consent must exist independently of
the supposedly affiliating conduct and must be justified on some
other basis. 72 Thus, we need some meta theory of legitimacy, independent of consent, to justify the rules for inferring consent. 73
The problem of developing and justifying these meta rules is
highlighted by a series of examples drawn from personal jurisdiction. First, if writing a derogatory article in Florida about someone
from California is enough affiliation to sue in California for defamation, 74 could a Florida publisher who purchased that article in
Florida from the writer be sued in California for failing to pay the
promised royalties? Has not the publisher affiliated himself with
California when he knowingly purchased an article about California? Second, it is generally accepted that a court has personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff for all counterclaims, both permissive and
compulsory, filed against the plaintiff in that suit. 75 But why is it
calls "open" benefits. Id. at 138. "It is precisely in cases of 'open' benefits that it is least
plausible to suggest that benefits are being accepted by most beneficiaries." Id. (emphasis in
original).
70 See Stewart, supra note 23, at 18; Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 890.
71 Stewart, supra note 23, at 7.
72 See Brilmayer, Consent & Contract, supra note 47, at 9.
75 The problem here is similar to a problem that exists with the first type of tacit consent.
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. There are, however, important differences.
With the first type of tacit consent, rules of interpretation are necessary to determine whether
a person in fact meant his or her conduct or silence to constitute consent. One might argue
that the development of these rules is no different than the problem of developing language.
By contrast, the second type of consent requires what might be called "rules of law" that
assigns consequences regardless of what was intended.
74 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984).
75 See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938).
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not the case that having once invoked the jurisdiction of a particular
court a plaintiff becomes subject to personal jurisdiction for all other
lawsuits that might be filed against him in that jurisdiction? By filing
one suit, the plaintiff has voluntarily recognized the legitimacy of a
state's judicial mechanism. Why should the plaintiff later be able to
disavow that recognition of legitimacy? 76 Finally, if one has voluntarily sold one's goods in, or voluntarily traveled through, a particular state, why is that not enough to subject one to suit in that state
on any matter (regardless of where one is served with process)?
In a possible response to these examples, Professor Stewart has
argued that "the right to remain unconnected with a sovereign may
be simultaneously waived and retained with respect to different
aspects of one's activities."" She then asserts that claims must be
"related" to the defendant's activities. 78 It is not obvious why the
right to remain unconnected to a sovereign also necessarily carries
the right to connect oneself less than completely. Moreover, the
assertion that suits must be related to the affiliating conduct simply
restates the issue, it does not explain why this must be so. The
answers to these questions turn ultimately_ on how much the state
may legitimately extract as a price for different types of conduct.
The fact that there was "voluntary affiliating conduct," however,
drops out of the analysis in this assessment. What becomes important is some theory about the scope of legitimate state power.
Treating the voluntary affiliating conduct of the defendant as
the source of legitimacy is not merely unhelpful, it cloaks governmental power with a veil of consent in a way that is destructive of
individual dignity. 79 Consider the following example. Suppose that
the government passes a law that states that any woman who exposes
any portion of her body is sexually provocative and shall be deemed
to have consented to the sexual advances of any man, but that
consent will not be imputed to any woman who does not so expose
herself and the government will take efforts to protect these nonexposed women. One response to this law is that it gives women
great protection and autonomy; now women have the ability to
76 One might argue that the plaintiff may have had no choice other than that particular
forum and therefore the filing of the suit could hardly be considered a voluntary acceptance
of that forum. The plaintiff, however, may or may not have had alternate fora. Moreover,
even if the plaintiff had no other available fora, she elected to attempt to convert her chose
in action into a judgment rather than abandoning it or selling it to someone else.
77 Stewart, supra note 23, at 21.
78 Id. at 25.
79 See Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1301.
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behave in a way that will protect them from undesired sexual advances. But many women would not view this law as enhancing their
autonomy. Because the government is presenting women with a
choice they do not think they should have to make, the fact that
they subsequently engage in some voluntary conduct, such as exposing their ankles, does not legitimize an exercise of power against
them, such as a sexual assault. 80
Rules about voluntary affiliation enhance individual autonomy
only to the extent they are perceived by the individual as embodying
legitimate and fair choices. Voluntary affiliation is not what legitimizes an exercise of power; what legitimizes the action is our belief
that the exercised· power is one that states should have. 81
Another example can be drawn from the personal jurisdiction
case law. In the Supreme Court case of Kulko v. Superior Court, 82 a
father sent his child to California to live with his ex-wife. When the
ex-wife sued the father in California for increased child support,
the Supreme Court held that California lacked personal jurisdiction. 83 Had the defendant sent a defamatory article84 or exploding
package to California, such acts surely would have been sufficient
to support jurisdiction. In explaining why sending a child to California was not sufficient for jurisdiction, the Court suggested that
its real concern was that a contrary conclusion might "impose an
unreasonable burden on family relations."85 Thus, the Court focused less on the defendant's voluntary affiliated conduct and focused more on whether the state could legitimately force the father
to choose between accommodating his child's wishes and thereby
subjecting himself to jurisdiction, or overriding those wishes to
protect himself from jurisdiction. 86
80 See B.rilmayer, Contract & Consent, supra note 47, at 21 (noting that "[b]y focusing on
choice, ... consent theory discourages analysis of an unresolved and important problem:
how did the individual come to have that set of choices and not another?").
81 Hanna Pitkin has made a related point about Locke. She has observed that under
Locke's approach, once someone had fallen within the scope of the state's legitimate power
then virtually any conduct was enough to create consent. See Pitkin, supra note 51, at 996.
Ultimately, the fact of consent is irrelevant. According to Pitkin, "[y]ou do not consent to be
obligated, but rather are obligated to consent if the government is just." I d. at 999. Pitkin
has also noted that Locke's theory of consent was intended not only to justify occasional
revolutions, it was also intended to legitimize most exercises of power. Pitkin, Obligation and
Consent-11, 60 AM. PoL. Scr. REv. 39, 49 (1966).
82 436 u.s. 84 (1978).
83 Id. at 100-01.
84 See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 688
F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982).
ss Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98.
86 As I discuss later, I do not believe the Court offered any plausible reason why

May 1991]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

545

3. Brilmayer's Fairness Approach
Professor Brilmayer, who has argued that personal jurisdiction
should be based upon a political philosophy of governmental legitimacy, has offered another approach. 87 She has acknowledged the
inadequacy of all the currently advanced theories, 88 including those
of tacit consent, 89 observing that "theories of tacit consent assume
almost exactly what they set out to prove." 90 As an alternative to
tacit consent, Professor Brilmayer has argued that we should abandon consent and apply a "fairness" inquiry that would consider
"whether an individual's connections with a state are such as to
make it fair to impose upon him or her the state's conception of
substantive justice."91 A volitional act must connect a non-domiciliary with a state in order "to assure a minimal level of individual
control over the legal norms to which the individual will be subjected."92 Although she offered this formulation of the "fairness"
argument in the context of choice of law, a similar approach might
be offered for personal jurisdiction.
Brilmayer's approach is a variation of the voluntary affiliation
argument and shares many of the same problems. She offers little
to explain what conduct should or should not be deemed an exercise
of control. Consider a confused tourist visiting Washington, D.C.,
who gets lost and mistakenly crosses a bridge into Virginia. It is
appropriate that the tourist be required to comply with Virginia
traffic laws and that she be subject to suit in Virginia for any injuries
that she happens to cause there. It is completely artificial, however,
to suggest that by crossing the Potomac River the tourist has made
a meaningful choice of legal norms.
In contrast to the confused togrist, consider a D.C. resident
who regularly drives in Virginia. If the D.C. resident hits a Virginia
pedestrian while driving in D.C., could she be sued in Virginia?
Her regular and knowing use of Virginia roads would seem to
California should not have the power to assert jurisdiction in that case. But in analyzing this
core issue, the Kulko Court properly treated as irrelevant the defendant's "voluntary affiliating
conduct." See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
87 See Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE LJ. 1277, 1304-06 (1989)
[hereinafter Rights & Fairness]; Brilmayer, Consent & Contract, supra note 47, at 10-14.
88 Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 308-10.
89 See Brilmayer, Rights & Fairness, supra note 87, at 1304-06; Brilmayer, Consent &
Contract, supra note 47, at 10-14.
90 Brilmayer, Rights & Fairness, supra note 87, at 1304.
91 Id. at 1306.
92 Id. at 1307.
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demonstrate much more of an acceptance 'of the legal norms of
Virginia than was demonstrated by the confused tourist. Suppose
that in addition to regularly driving in Virginia, the D.C. resident
participated in political campaigns and debate in Virginia. Would
this be sufficient to make her subject to suit in Virginia?
In explaining why some applications should be considered sufficient and others not, Brilmayer has argued that a "state cannot
justify predicating jurisdiction upon local conduct that is not legally
wrongful." 93 If the goal of jurisdiction is to assure some individual
control of the applicable legal norms, however, Brilmayer has no
reason to differentiate between legal and illegal conduct. In fact,
engaging in illegal or wrongful conduct in a state seems on its face
to demonstrate a rejection of that state's legal norms.
B. Problems with Linking Interstate Personal Jurisdiction and Political
Philosophy

Although an inquiry into the foundations of political legitimacy
can be fascinating, treating personal jurisdiction as an outgrowth of
this inquiry produces significant difficulties. At the outset, if a coherent doctrine of personal jurisdiction depends on the development and acceptance of a coherent philosophy of political legitimacy, then we are in for a long fight. 94 The problem of political
legitimacy has troubled philosophers for centuries. Even if a consensus were achieved, variations within the same general philosophical approach may produce significantly different results when applied to personal jurisdiction. For example, Professor Trangsrud,
who argues that personal jurisdiction ought to reflect a social contract theory of political legitimacy, describes the contours of personal jurisdiction based on such a theory. 95 Basically, he would
require knowing, affiliating conduct on the part of the defendant. 96
Yet, a different version of the social contract approach, such as that
of Rawls, 97 might produce a very different doctrine of personal
jurisdiction. Someone designing a personal jurisdiction doctrine

Brilmayer, General jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 740.
Brilmayer, in the same article in which she argues that any theory of jurisdiction
should be based upon a philosophical theory of governmental legitimacy, acknowledges the
inadequacy of all the currently advanced theories. Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23,
at 308-10.
95 Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 898-903.
96 Id. at 890.
97 See]. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1971).
9s

94
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behind Rawls's "veil of ignorance," 98 with no knowledge of whether
she would be a plaintiff or defendant, might design a system without
the heavy defendant bias of either our existing or the Trangsrud
approach. 99
More fundamentally, even if we could reach complete agreement on the philosophical theory to apply, it simply does not follow
that our philosophical ideals about legitimate governmental power
must necessarily be reflected in a constitutional doctrine of interstate
personal jurisdiction. 100 It is not merely that the philosophical approach is unduly generalized or theoretical. 101 The problem is that
political philosophy cannot tell us whether our Constitution contemplates a system in which state adjudicatory authority is constitutionally limited.
With respect to interstate personal jurisdiction, the issue is not
under what circumstances people must respect political authority
or the authority of a wholly unrelated sovereign. We are already
one nation of interdependent states, bound by shared values and
one constitution. Inherent in our existence as a nation is that each
state and its citizens necessarily accepts the political legitimacy of all
the other states. 102 Concerns about political legitimacy might appropriately underlie personal jurisdiction in the international, but not
m the interstate, context. 103 The difference between Florida and
See id. at 136-42.
Applying Rawls's principle of "maximin," id. at 154, one would expect those behind
the veil of ignorance to adopt procedural rules that allocate burdens relatively evenly between
plaintiffs and defendants since that minimizes the losses suffered by anyone who ends up as
a litigant.
100 See Laycock, Equality and the Citizens of Sister States, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 431, 43233 (1987) (questioning the usefulness of political philosophy in providing answers to questions
about interstate relations).
101 See id. at 432.
102 See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1 (requiring states to recognize certain governmental acts
of other states); id. § 4 (guaranteeing to every state "a Republican Form of Government").
The undeniable interdependence created among the states by the Constitution seems to pose
a particular problem for those who would rely on a theory of tacit consent to limit state
adjudicatory power. In "consenting" to a nation consisting of interdependent states and
accepting the benefits that accrue from the free interstate flow of goods and people, why
have not all United States residents "consented" to be sued in any state? Professor Trangsrud's
response to this question appears to be that the Constitution does not specifically address the
question of state jurisdiction and therefore, it is reading too much into the situation to infer
consent from mere acceptance of the Constitution. Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 887. Yet,
this seems no more of an overreading than inferring "consent" to jurisdiction from the act
of driving a car in the state, see Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), or from the act of
writing a defamatory article, see Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
tos As Professor Laycock has observed, "[t]he relationship among the American states is
fundamentally different from the relationship among independent nations." Laycock, supra
98

99
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California on the one hand and Florida and Iran on the other is
not merely one of degree. 104
The Constitution clearly contemplates the existence of states
that are delineated geographically. The Constitution also contemplates that citizens of the United States will have a unique relationship with one state and not the others, that is, they will be citizens
of that state. 105 As a corollary of the unique relationship between a
state and its citizens, those citizens will have unique rights, such as
voting, and unique obligations, such as jury duty. But the fact that
an admittedly special relationship between a state and its citizens
exists does not mean that no relationship exists between a state and
noncitizens. The Constitution in fact contemplates that interaction
will arise between states and noncitizens and that states will be
asserting power against noncitizens (hence, the privileges and immunities clause). The core question with regard to personal jurisdiction is how does the Constitution limit the exercise of state adjudicative authority.
Once one accepts that states are not wholly autonomous and
separate from each other, it becomes very difficult to base personal
jurisdiction doctrine on a theory of political obligation. 106 For example, one could accept a traditional consent theory of political
legitimacy yet still conclude that states have unlimited adjudicatory
authority by arguing that by participating in our interdependent
nation with its free interstat~ flow of goods and services, we have
all consented to be sued in any state. The free flow of commerce
among the states has many benefits, but one of its costs is that

note 100, at 432. Professor Maltz argues that by suggesting that a defendant from another
country should be treated differently than United States citizens, the Court had recognized
that a citizen of one state is "already indirectly connected" to all the other states "through
the structure of the federal system," whereas, "a citizen of a foreign country has no such
automatic connection." Maltz, supra note 28, at 690.
104 A comparison of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), with the Salman Rushdie
affair demonstrates how differently we view the question of the legitimacy of governmental
power when it is exercised in the international rather than interstate context. In Calder, the
Supreme Court held that a Florida writer and editor of an allegedly defamatory article
concer~ing a Californian could properly be sued in California because California was "the
focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered." I d. at 789. Calder was a unanimous
decision, yet there would surely not be similar unanimity that a Florida citizen who authored
a book considered by Iranians to be defamatory has likewise subjected himself to the governmental processes of Iran.
105 See, e.g., U.S. CoNST. art III,§ 2 (giving federal courts jurisdiction over cases between
"Citizens of different States").
106 See Tushnet, Community and Fairness in Democratic Theory, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 417,
423-42 (1987).
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interstate commerce sometimes produces detrimental effects on
places far away from one of the participants in a transaction. Having
accepted the benefits of our free flowing economy, it is fair to
impose the burden of possible distant litigation.
Moreover, even if one were to accept that state adjudicatory
authority turns on whether the exercise of power conforms to an
underlying philosophy of what constitutes legitimate authority, this
view does not explain why the federal courts need to intrude on
states by striking down state exercises of authority. The Constitution
provides a simple, non-intrusive solution-diversity jurisdiction. In
most cases in which a state would be asserting jurisdiction over
noncitizens, it is likely that diversity would exist and the case could
be removed to the federal court (assuming of course Congress
authorized diversity jurisdiction and removal). Whatever connection
one believes is necessary to make legitimate a state's assertion of
jurisdiction over a citizen of some other state, the requisite connection surely exists between a United States citizen or resident and a
United States court. 107 The combination of the privileges and immunities clause, assuring equal treatment for those who choose to
litigate before a "foreign sovereign," and the option to litigate before one's own sovereign, i.e., the United States, solves the problem.
One might complain that removing the case to federal court
does not move the case out of state and thus the federal judge and
jury will have local ties. This concern focuses more on local bias (an
issue that has never been addressed by personal jurisdiction doctrine) than on the sovereign's identity. The more c~mpelling response is that removal does not cause a change in venue because
Congress did not choose to structure the courts that way. No constitutional requirement exists that federal districts be coextensive
with the states 108 or that removal be to the federal district that
includes the state in which the action was filed. Removal could be
to federal court in the defendant's home state or to some other
location. Thus, the Constitution gives the federal government a
mechanism for protecting citizens from having to litigate before
sovereigns with whom they do not have the requisite affiliation.
Given the availability of this mechanism, no reason founded on
political philosophy exists why the federal courts should create their

107 See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421 (1932); see also Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
108 See United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 602-04 (1878).
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own elaborate doctrine, which directly intrudes on state autonomy
and authority. 109
II.

OTHER jusTIFICATIONS FOR CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE
ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY-COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALOGY

In addition to, or as an alternative to, the political legitimacy
and consent rationale, commentators have suggested that commerce
clause-related concerns may justify limitations on personal jurisdiction.uo This approach is related in some respects to the political
legitimacy rationale. Federal intervention into state regulation based
on the commerce clause has been justified as a means for preventing
states from imposing costs on outsiders who are not represented in
the state's political processes.m One might characterize this justification as a matter of democratic theoryl1 2 or economic efficiency.ll 3
At first glance, personal jurisdiction seems to fit easily into a
similar type of analysis. For example, assertions of jurisdiction over
outsiders might be a way for states to shift litigation costs from its
citizens to outsiders.u 4 In fact, in a handful of pre-International
Shoe 115 cases, the United States Supreme Court directly invoked the
109 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), indicates that in at least some contexts the
Court has been reluctant to infer constitutional limitations of state adjudicatory authority. In
Hall, the Court held that the Constitution did not prohibit a California state court from
adjudicating a claim against the state of Nevada. /d. at 426-27. In so holding, the Court
acknowledged that the Constitution does contain some specific limitation on state sovereignty,
but rejected the argument that the Constitution implicitly prohibits states from adjudicating
suits against other states. /d. at 424-25. The Court observed:
[I]n view of the Tenth Amendment's reminder that powers not delegated to
the Federal Government nor prohibited to the States are rderved to the States
or to the people, the existence of express limitations on state sovereignty may
equally imply that caution should be exercised before concluding that unstated
limitations on state power were intended by the Framers.
/d. at 425 (footnote omitted). A constitutional doctrine of personal jurisdiction is likewise an
inferred limit on state sovereignty and a similar caution would seem to be appropriate.
110 See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 23, at 86-87; Brilmayer, General
Jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 743-46; Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 226, 234 (1967); Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 88.1;
Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Long Ann jurisdiction, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 156,
174-77 (1982).
111 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945); South Carolina State
Highway Dep't v. Barnell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938).
112 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 409 (2d ed. 1988).
113 See Tushnet, Rethinking the Donnant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wise. L. REv. 125, 14243.
114 See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 23, at 86-87; Brilmayer, General jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 743; Carrington & Martin, supra note 110, at 234; Trangsrud, supra
note 23, at 881; Comment, supra note llO, at 174-77.
115 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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commerce clause to strike down what it viewed as overly expansive
exercises of state court jurisdiction. 116
Although some courts and commentators have viewed these
cases as moribund, 117 the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Bendix
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises 118 may indicate a revival of the
Court's direct reliance on the commerce clause to limit personal
jurisdiction. In Bendix, the Court struck down, on commerce clause
grounds, an Ohio statute that suspended the statute of limitations
for all claims against foreign entities that had not designated an
agent for service of process in Ohio.l 19 Noting that the presence of
an agent for service of process would subject the corporation to
general jurisdiction, the Court held that requiring a corporation to
submit to general jurisdiction is a "significant burden" on interstate
commerce. ~'20
Although this commerce clause approach has some intuitive
appeal, it does not withstand scrutiny. This approach, like dormant
commerce clause analysis, includes two separate concerns-undue
burdens on interstate commerce and discrimination against out-ofstaters.121 Neither concern provides a satisfactory explanation for
personal jurisdiction.

A. Undue Burdens
Commentators have suggested that a state's overly aggressive
assertion 0f personal jurisdiction may impede interstate commerce
because producers, fearful that they may have to litigate in some
11 6 See Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1929); Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101, 103 (1924); Davis v. Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 316
(1923). For a discussion of these cases by Judge Friendly, see Scanapico v. Richmond, F. &
P.R.R., 439 F.2d 17, 25-27 (2d Cir. 1970) (rehearing en bane).
117 See Scanapico, 439 F.2d at 28 (Hys, ]., concurring) (characterizing these cases as
reflecting "a long-outmoded view of 'burden on interstate commerce"'); F. jAMES & G.
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 2.29, at 103 (3d ed. 1985) (arguing that the Court's rejection in
personal jurisdiction doctrine of special protection of first amendment concerns implies a
similar rejection of special protection for interstate commerce); Dessem, Personal jurisdiction
after Asahi: The Other (International) Shoe Drops, 55 TENN. L. REv. 41, 87-88 (1987) (same). Cf
Comment, supra note 110, at 175 ("[t]he constitutional interest in facilitating interstate commerce seems to require additional jurisdiction limitations beyond the minimum safeguards
of causation, notice, and relevance provided by due process"); Developments in the Law: State
Court jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 983-87 (1960) (urging reliance on commerce clause
as a limitation on personal jurisdiction).
118 486 u.s. 888 (1988).
119 I d. at 894.
120 Id. at 891-92.
121 See id. at 891; Tushnet, supra note 113, at 130-31.
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distant forum, may either curtail production or increase prices. 122
Thus, proponents of this view might argue that if the car dealer in
World-Wide Volkswagen 123 could be sued anywhere that the car he
sold blew up, then he would have to curtail his sales or raise the
price of his cars in order to cover the costs of this additional risk.
In effect, the risk of litigation in distant fora impedes interstate
commerce.
This argument about burdening commerce ignores the teaching of Ronald Coase that the allocation of external effects does not
affect economic efficiency. 124 Litigation necessarily involves two parties and when they are from different states, at least one of those
parties will necessarily be forced to bear the cost and disadvantage
of litigation away from home. 125 Personal jurisdiction doctrine simply allocates the right not to have to travel for litigation, but there
is no theoretical reason why systematically giving that right to defendants rather than plaintiffs will alter the number of transactions.
To return to World-Wide Volkswagen, a buyer of the car will value
the car somewhat less if she knows she will have to return to New
York for any litigation no matter where she is when her dispute
with the seller arises.
The failure of the Court and commentators to perceive the
two-sided nature of the jurisdiction problem extends to the noncommercial context as well. In Kulka, the Court held that a divorced
father who, "in the interests of family harmony and his children's
preferences," allowed his children to spend more time in California
with their mother than the separation agreement required, could
not be sued in California for increased child support. 126 The Court
did not want to "discourage parents from entering into reasonable
visitation agreements." 127 But this reasoning ignores that cooperation is two-sided. As a result of the Court's ruling, the parent who
relies on child-support may be discouraged from accommodating
the desires (and maybe best interests) of her children because of
122

at 174.

See Brilmayer, General jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 745; Comment, supra note 110,

444 u.s. 286 (1980).
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). See generally Demsetze,
When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972).
12s See Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1298-99.
126 436 u.s. 84, 94 (1978).
127
I d. at 93; see Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1298. Interestingly, although Professor Gottlieb
criticized the Court for its failure in commercial cases to understand that the burden to travel
must rest somewhere, he praised the Court's analysis in Kulko. Gottlieb, supra note 19, at
1298.
123
124
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the burdens associated with seeking the needed increases in support.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, transaction costs or information imbalances may exist so that allocating the right not to travel
could have efficiency implications. For example, one could argue
that the buyer should bear the cost of distant litigation because the
buyer is able, at least theoretically, to ascertain in advance where a
product was made or sold, whereas the seller can never be sure
where its products may end up. Therefore, the buyer can calculate
with greater certainty the cost of distant litigation.
This argument has a number of weaknesses. First, the requisite
cost calculation requires information about the costs associated with
distant litigation as well as the likelihood of litigation. The seller
may be in a better position to acquire this information. Second,
although it may be theoretically possible for a buyer to ascertain
the place of manufacture or distribution, the costs of acquiring this
information for individual products may be impractical. Finally, this
argument focuses on buyers and sellers, whereas personal jurisdiction doctrine focuses on plaintiffs and defendants. Although in tort
litigation buyers are typically the plaintiffs and sellers the defendants, these roles are certainly not true in contract litigation. 128
The foregoing discussion of the effects of distant litigation on
buyers and sellers illustrates that a thorough assessment of the
efficiency implications of allocating to one party the right not to
travel may be quite complicated and require information to which
the courts do not have easy access. It is also probably impossible to
generalize this information into a single rule for plaintiffs and
defendants. At the very least, those who argue that interstate commerce will be enhanced by allocating the right not to travel to distant
fora to all defendants, or at least to defendants who have not
"purposefully availed," have not yet proven their case.
Even if a state's broad assertion of jurisdiction over out-of-state
defendants did impose a burden on interstate commerce, the state's
conduct would not necessarily be impermissible. Under traditional
commerce clause analysis, the court would balance the state's inter128 See, e.g., Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596,
598 (7th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff was the manufacturer), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980);
Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 988-89 (D.C. App. 1981) (plaintiff was a lawyer suing
former client to recover fees for legal services), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982). Professor
Gottlieb argues that distant litigation may be the most burdensome on the "one-shot" litigant
involved in a relatively small case. Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1322-23. There is no reason to
assume that such litigants will always, or even usually, be defendants.
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est in jurisdiction against the burdens imposed on the defendant. 129
The burdens imposed by more expansive personal jurisdiction may
be quite modest. 130 The burden at issue is not the burden of litigation, because personal jurisdiction does not protect a defendant
from suit, but rather the incremental additional cost that must be
incurred by virtue of litigating in some forum other than one's
home state. This additional cost may be quite small. On the other
hand, the assertion of jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant
may serve a legitimate state interest. In the context of products
liability, for example, a state might conclude that the burdens of
distant litigation may be particularly onerous for plaintiffs who tend
to be one-time players in the legal system, who may find it particularly difficult to find a lawyer in a different state, and who may
lack the necessary resources for the upfront costs of distant litigation.
Would the burden imposed on the out-of-state defendant in
such a case outweigh the benefit to local residents? Unfortunately,
the Court has offered no coherent test to "weigh" these burdens
and benefits.]ust as the Court seems to have ignored the substantive
policy choices inherent in its balancing approach to the commerce
clause, 131 it also seems not to have understood that similar substantive choices are inherent in the decision to allocate to one party
rather than another the right not to litigate in a distant or unrelated
forum. 132

B. Discrimination
Even if a state's decision to impose the burdens of distant
litigation on the out-of-state defendant does not burden commerce,
it could be argued that a systematic shifting of costs from in-staters
to out-of-staters is exactly the type of protectionist discrimination
the dormant commerce clause prohibits. 133 This argument has several problems. First, a protectionist motive is problematic. Allowing
129 See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., •!86 U.S. 888, 891-92 (1988); Pike v.
Bruse Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Tushnet, supra note 113, at 135.
130 See Brilmayer, General jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 776.
131 See Bendix, 486 U.S. at 896-97 (Scalia,]., concurring); Tushnet, supra note 113, at
146-47.
132 This is well-illustrated by Kullw, in which the Court apparently used personal jurisdiction doctrine to promote conciliation and the free flow of children between divorced
parents. See Kullw v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978). But this goal was achieved at tlte
expense of the parent who was dependent on child support.
133 See Brilmayer, General jurisdiction, rupra note 49, at 746.
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an in-state plaintiff to sue a foreign defendant at the plaintiff's
home does not clearly produce any net savings for the plaintiff's
home state. Court systems are expensive to run. The marginal cost
of providing a forum, minus the savings to the plaintiff, may be
greater than what it would have cost the plaintiff to litigate elsewhere. Thus, a protectionist rationale is not obvious from the mere
fact that a state is willing to adjudicate these cases. 134
Second, even assuming a protectionist motive, it is not clear
why states cannot be protectionist in this context. When a plaintiff
and a defendant are from different states, at least one will unavoidably bear the burden of distant litigation. There are only two options-either the in-state plaintiff or the out-of-state defendant
bears the burden. In this context, it seems odd to conclude that the
Constitution requires states to choose to disadvantage their citizens.135
It is sometimes argued that notwithstanding a state's legitimate
interest in providing a forum for its local plaintiffs, a bias in favor
of defendants is warranted because "society normally gives less
weight to the interest of the plaintiff who disturbed the tranquility
and initiated the litigation." 136 Whatever the pedigree of the view
that plaintiffs generally should be regarded as troublemakers, there
are several difficulties with incorporating it into personal jurisdic- ·
tion doctrine. First, as an empirical description of actual attitudes
of society, it is disputable that plaintiffs are generally viewed as
troublemakers. Surely most plaintiffs would describe the situation
differently and argue that the defendant, not the litigation, disrupted the status quo. As Marc Galanter has reminded us, disputes
exist before, not because of, litigation. 137 Moreover, in at least some
15" Moreover, not all personal jurisdiction cases involve in-state plaintiffs. In WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), Oklahoma was willing to open its
courts to an out-of-state plaintiff to sue out-of-state defendants. Thus, it was not a case in
which the forum sought expansive jurisdiction to advantage in-staters to the detriment of
out-of-staters.
1ss See Maltz, Visions of Fairness-The Relationship Between jurisdiction and Choice-ofLaw,
30 Aruz. L. REv. 751, 768 (1988). In the context of choice of law, the Supreme Court has
recognized that when the forum has a legitimate interest in a controversy, it has no obligation
to defer to the interests of another state. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-24 (f979);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
156 Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An Analysis of
Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 335, 351 (1972); see also von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 49, at 1148.
•s 7 Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 12 (1983).
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contexts, society views litigation as a constructive, socially beneficial
activity. Provisions for attorneys' fees 138 or treble damages 139 are
designed to encourage the bringing of certain suits. 140
Second, even if an anti-plaintiff bias generally exists, the more
fundamental question is whether the Constitution mandates that
states adopt this anti-plaintiffview. 141 This question reflects a classic
problem of defining the appropriate constitutional baseline from
which to evaluate state power. 142 There is certainly no textual basis
for concluding that states are required to treat litigation as disruptive rather than restorative of the status quo. 143 Where states have
affirmatively chosen to favor one side in litigation, there is no reason
why the Constitution should displace that choice. 144
The final problem with the discrimination explanation of personal jurisdiction is one of remedy. If a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a foreigner represents discrimination against foreigners,
we would expect that it would be prohibited. But the Court has
long permitted states to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners in at
least some circumstances, such as when the defendant is served
within the state 145 or, more recently, when the defendant "purposefully avails" itself of the state.I46
Yet neither the presence of the defendant in the state nor the
·purposeful availment of the defendant in any way lessens the supposed discrimination problem. If the state's assertion of jurisdiction
was intended to or has the effect of unduly burdening a foreigner,
it is hard to see how that problem is cured by the fact that the
defendant engaged in purposeful conduct directed at the state.
Even if a state can assert jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants
only if they have engaged in conduct directed at the state, that state
is still imposing the burdens of distant litigation on the out-of-stater
to the benefit of the in-state plaintiff. In the commerce clause cases,
the Court has never suggested that by voluntarily doing business in
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
140 See generally Brilmayer, Interstate Federalism, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 949, 956-60 (de·
scribing pro-plaintiff bias of modern choice of law methodology).
141 See Abrams, supra note 20, at 24.
142 See generally Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
143 Cf id. at 912-15 (arguing that although some constitutional provisions incorporate
baselines, others do not).
144 See id. at 910-12.
145 See Burnham v. Superior Court, IIO S. Ct. 2105, 2II0-13 (1990) (Scalia, J.).
146 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudcwicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson v.
Denc)da, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
·
1ss
1s9
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or with a state, an out-of-state business "agreed" to the special
burdens imposed on it 147 and therefore cannot raise a challenge to
those burdens. 148
C. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises: Combining
Personal jurisdiction with the Commerce Clause

The commentators are not alone in linking personal jurisdiction with commerce clause-related concerns. The Supreme Court
in the recent case of Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises 149
suggested that it might be interested in such an approach.
In Bendix, an Ohio statute suspended its statute of limitations
for all claims against entities that were not within the state and had
not designated an agent for service of process. 150 Thus, in order
for a foreign corporation to take advantage of the Ohio statute of
limitations, it had to appoint an agent for service of process and
subject itself to general jurisdiction in Ohio. 151
Having assumed that the coerced appointment of an agent was
an effective waiver of any minimum contacts requirement, the Bendix Court then considered the impact of this waiver on interstate
commerce. 152 In striking down the statute, the Court did not in-

Contac~

147 Brilmayer, How
Count, supra note 23, at 96. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986). In addition to suggesting that the defendant's
consent eliminates any concern about discrimination, Brilmayer also argues that the requirement of purposeful contacts assures that the consumers in a high cost forum will bear the
costs associated with that forum's expensive legal system. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra
note 23, at 94-96. As I have argued elsewhere, this is true only if price discrimination is
possible. See Perdue, supra note 19, at 515 n.207.
148 For example, in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, the Court struck
down a North Carolina statute prohibiting the sale of apples in closed containers that
displayed a grade other than the applicable U.S. Grade. 432 U.S. 333, 335, 352-53 (1977).
The Court found that the statute deprived Washington State apple producers of a competitive
advantage gained by their local-grading system. I d. at 352. The Court nowhere suggests that
because Washington producers voluntarily sold their apples in North Carolina this legitimized
the burdensome statute.
149 486 u.s. 888 (1988).
150 Id. at 889.
151 Id. at 892.
152 I d. at 891-92. Interestingly, the Court seemed to assume that a corporation's "consent" to jurisdiction, given in exchange for the right to rely on Ohio law, was completely
valid and effective. See id. at 892-93. Although consistent with a 1917 case, see Pennsylvania
Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917}, it is nonetheless
somewhat surprising that none of the Justices seemed troubled by this extorted waiver of a
constitutional right. See Bendix, 486 U.S. at 893-94. Concern about the validity of such a
waiver has led some commentators to argue that statutes similar to the Ohio statute violate
due process. See, e.g, Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 759-60. The Supreme

558

BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:529

dicate clearly whether the problem was an undue burden on commerce or discrimination. The Court announced at the beginning of
its opinion that it was analyzing the problem as an undue burden
rather than as discrimination. 153 Nonetheless, in explaining why the
statute constituted an undue burden, the Court pointed to the
discriminatory nature of the statute, noting that "the Ohio statute
impose[d] a greater burden on out-of-state companies than it does
on Ohio companies, subjecting the activities of foreign and domestic
corporations to inconsistent regulations." 154
Any supposed discrimination in the statute is more apparent
than real. Although the statute forced out-of-state corporations to
appoint an in-state agent for service of process, domestic corporations were already required under Ohio corporate law to have an
in-state agent for service of process. 155 Thus, the statute in question,
rather than discriminating, served to equalize treatment between
domestic and foreign corporations.
The undue burden analysis adopted by the Bendix Court is also
problematic. The Court asserted without explanation that
"[r]equiring a foreign corporation ... to defend itself with reference

Court has never directly addressed the due process issue. See G.D. Searle &: Co. v. Cohn, 455
U.S. 404, 412 n.7 (1982). The lower courts are split on the issue. Compare In re Mid-Atlantic
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1277-78 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd, 704 F.2d 125 (4th
Cir. 1983); Schreider v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1090-91 (D. Kan. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (lOth Cir. 1979) (finding due process violation) wilh
Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1109-12 (Del. 1988) (finding no due process violation).
Moreover, a year before Bendix, the Court had struck down a state's conditioning a rebuilding
permit on the owner's granting a public easement. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987). The Court noted that unless the permit condition served the same
purpose as the development ban, the condition would be "'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'"
/d. at 836-37; see also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987).
See generally Seidman, Rejlecti= on Context and the Constitution, 73 MINN. L. REv. 73 (1988)
(discussing constitutional issues involved when governments impose conditions on offers they
are not obligated to extend).
It is also somewhat surprising that the Court assumed that the mere presence within the
state of an agent is sufficient to subject the corporation to general jurisdiction. Two years
after Bendix, in Burnham v. Superior Court, the Court reaffirmed the validity of transient
jurisdiction. 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2119, 2126 (1990). At the time of Bendix, however, its validity
was very much an open question. Most commentators had argued that after Shaffer v. Heitner
transient jurisdiction was no longer valid. See, e.g., Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death
Warrant for the Transient Rule of/nPersonamjurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REv. 38, 68 (1980); Kalo,
jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development ofQuasi In Rem and In Personam Principles,
1978 DuKE L.]. 1147, 1191; Vernon, Singlefactor Bases of In Personam jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 302-03.
1ss Bendix, 486 U.S. at 891.
Is• /d. at 894 (citation omitted).
155 See OHIO REv. ConE ANN.§ 1701.07(a) (Baldwin 1986).
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to all transactions, including those in which it did not have the
minimum contacts necessary for supporting personal jurisdiction,
is a significant burden." 156 As Justice Scalia observed in his concurrence, the majority made no attempt to quantify or even describe
the nature of this burden. 15'
The Bendix Court next considered the benefits of the Ohio
scheme. The justification for the state statute offered by the majority
was that "serving foreign corporate defendants may be more arduous than serving domestic corporations or foreign corporations
with a designated agent for service." 158 Although the Court acknowledged that this state interest was "legitimate," at least for equal
protection and due process purposes, 159 it apparently concluded,
though it never explicitly stated, that this interest was worth less
then the costs imposed on out-of-state defendants. As Justice Scalia
noted in his concurrence, this type of balancing is "like judging
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." 160
Although the Court's explicit rationale in Bendix is not satisfactory, another explanation for the Court's conclusion is possible. The
Court may have perceived Bendix as a case in which Ohio was
imposing one cost on foreign defendants (the costs of being subjected to general jurisdiction) so as to reduce some other cost to
Bendix, 486 U.S. at 893.
I d. at 895-96 (Scalia, J., concurring). In fact, the one case that the majority cites for
its assertion that this represents a significant burden is inapposite. See id. at 893 (citing Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)). The discussion in Asahi to which
the Bendix Court was apparently referring is a discussion of the particular burden of litigating
in a foreign country. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
15s Bendix, 486 U.S. at 893.
159 ld. at 894.
160 Id. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Tushnet, supra note 113, at 144-45 (discussing problems involvc;d with balancing incommensurables).
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court provides an interesting
counterpoint to Bendix. In Burnham, the Court held that a state may constitutionally exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based solely on the presence of the defendant within
the state and regardless of whether his presence is related at all to the cause of action. 110
S. Ct. 2105, 2119 (1990) (Scalia, J.); id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2126
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. (Stevens,]., concurring). Although there were only plurality
opinions, four and possibly five justices accepted Justice Brennan's assertion that "[t]he
potential burdens on a transient defendant are slight." Id. at 2125 (Brennan,]., concurring).
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined Brennan's opinion. Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, expressed his agreement with "the considerations of fairness identified by Justice Brennan." Id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although Burnham was not
argued as a commerce clause case, the bold assertion that transient jurisdiction imposes few
burdens stands in striking contrast to the equally bold assertion in Bendix that jurisdiction
was a significant burden. This seeming contradiction reinforces the perception that Bendix
was not a case of unreasonable burdens.
156
157
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plaintiffs (the costs of out-of-state service of process). Fundamentally, the problem seems to be that the state's solution is far broader
than necessary to cure the problem. If the problem is the cost of
out-of-state service of process, then the easy solution would be to
require appointment of an agent for service of process, while also
providing that the presence of an agent does not constitute a waiver
of the minimum contacts requirements. 161 Thus, the fundamental
problem with the Ohio statute may have been that the burdens it
imposed were not sufficiently connected to its purpose and it was
therefore irrational.t62
If the real problem in Bendix was that the statute was irrational,
then that case does not illuminate what the Court should do when
a state exerts expansive jurisdiction to prevent plaintiffs from having to bear the burdens of distant litigation. In such a case, the
solution seems closely tailored to the problem. Confronted with the
reality that someone must bear the costs of litigation in a distant
forum or in a forum with which they have not or would not otherwise affiliate themselves, it does not seem irrational for a state to
choose to put that cost on defendants rather than plaintiffs. 163

IV.

AN ALTERNATIVE FoRMULATION OF THE PROBLEM

Although the traditional understanding of the problem for
which personal jurisdiction is the solution is inadequate, there may
be problems for which personal jurisdiction is the solution. These
problems do not involve profound or abstract issues of the nature
of sovereignty or the sources of governmental legitimacy. They are
much more mundane and reflect the considerations that motivate
actual litigants to care about personal jurisdiction.
Litigants do care about personal jurisdiction; indeed, they care
enough to litigate the issue of personal jurisdiction all the way to

See Cutler v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 168, 171-72 (D.NJ. 1989).
See Tushnet, supra note 113, at 146-47 (discussing how in burden cases, the Supreme
Court will strike down state regulations when the regulations do little to advance the state
interest asserted).
163 Interestingly, in the handful of pre-International Shoe cases in which defendants
challenged assertions of personal jurisdiction on commerce clause grounds, the Supreme
Court expressly held that having the plaintiff's residence within the forum was an important
factor that diminished the likelihood of a commerce clause violation. See, e.g., International
Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511, 519-20 (1934); State ex rel. St. Louis B.
& M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 207 (1924); Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S.
312, 316-17 (1923); see also Scanapico v. Richmond, F. & P. R.R., 439 F.2d 17, 25-27 (2d
Cir. 1970) (reconsideration en bane).
161

162
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the United States Supreme Court. They care not because of abstract
philosophical reasons, but because the place where the litigation is
conducted has a number of practical consequences: choice oflaw; 164
convenience or inconvenience for one party; 165 and local bias 166 or
perception that judges or juries in particular locales are more or
less generous. 167 In short, there are numerous practical reasons why
choice of forum matters.
Personal jurisdiction limits the plaintiff's choice of fora. The
fundamental question is whether there are reasons why the federal
courts should limit the plaintiff's choice. Although my conclusions
are still somewhat tentative, I believe that it is possible to justify a
personal jurisdiction doctrine, the sole purpose of which is to limit
plaintiff's choice of fora.
The rationale for such a doctrine would derive from three
m£tior practical reasons why litigants care about choice of forum:
convenience, 168 bias, 169 and choice of law. 170 All three of these considerations can be conceived of as problems for which the federal
164 See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (forum state may
constitutionally apply its own statute of limitations). In Keeton v. Hustler Magaz.ine, Inc., the
plaintiff's choice of New Hampshire as the forum and defendant's objection to that forum
seems to have been largely a function of New Hampshire's six year statute of limitations. See
465 U.S. 770,772 n.1 (1984). Likewise, some commentators have noted that the fundamental
concerns of the parties in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), were choice of law
questions. See, e.g., Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 619-23 (1958); Scott, Hanson v. Denckla,
72 HARV. L. REv. 695, 698-700 (1959).
165 See National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 326-27 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957); Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950); Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1325-27.
166 Although the cases do not involve personal jurisdiction, observers of both the Pete
Rose suit against the Commissioner of Baseball and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1
(1987), have suggested that local bias may have played a role. See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1989,
§ 1, at 37, col. 2 (Pete Rose); id., June 30, 1989, at A22, col. 5 (same); NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6,
1987, at 2 (Pennz.oil); id., Mar. 16, 1987, at 8 (same).
167 See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 202-03 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). For a discussion of the Union Carbide case, see NAT'L LJ.,
July 20, 1987, at 30; id., Dec. 30, 1985, at S-2; id., Dec. 31, 1984, at 3.
168 See Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1321-27 (discussing convenience and why it matters
to litigants).
169 See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-the Insignificance of Foresight,
70 YALE L.J. 554, 601 (1961). See also supra notes 166 & 167 for examples of cases where
choice of forum was influenced by concerns about bias.
170 See Youngblood, Constitutional Constraints on Choice of Law: The Nexus Between WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hayne, 50 ALBANY L. REv.
39 (1985); see also Brilmayer, General jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 777-78 (noting that "only
when plaintiffs are able tc::i forum shop for applicable law and not just forum location do
they choose ridiculously inconvenient or disinterested forums").
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courts should supply a solution. As I discuss below, however, I
believe that the concern that is the most likely basis for any significant personal jurisdiction limitation is choice of law.
A. Convenience
Where litigation involves parties from different states, at least
one party will suffer the inconvenience of having to litigate away
from home. Although there may be legitimate reasons for a legislature to favor one side over another with respect to convenience, 171
there is no reason why the federal courts should mandate a systematic preference for one side.
The one situation in which federal court intervention on the
grounds of convenience might be appropriate is where a forum is
so burdensome that a party cannot defend herself. The right to
have one's day in court is a fundamental component of traditional
procedural due process. 172 In a few situations, a forum may be so
burdensome that as a practical matter, a party is deprived of her
day in court. 173
A personal jurisdiction doctrine based on this concern will likely
be extremely limited in its effect because it is difficult to structure
a jurisdictional rule that deals effectively with this problem. One
could, for example, have a rule that suits can only be prosecuted in
the defendant's place of residence. Although such a rule would
virtually eliminate the likelihood that defendants would be unduly
burdened, it would also mean that some plaintiffs would be denied
their day in court. A more individualized inquiry would lead to
uncertainty and make the defense of unreasonable inconvenience
one that is expensive to raise. 174 Thus, although there may be cases
where it is appropriate for the federal courts to intervene in order
171

For example, the legislature might wish to encourage or discourage particular types

of suits.
172 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ("The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."').
173 Several commentators have argued that personal jurisdiction doctrine should be
directed primarily to this problem of inconvenience. See Redish, supra note 18, at 1135;
Weintraub, supra note 18, at 528; Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses
(Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 735, 846 (1981). For an argument that the location of trial
will rarely interfere with a party's ability to defend her rights, see Borchers, The Death of the
Constitutional Law of Personal jurisdiction: From Penn oyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 19, 95 (1990).
174 See Borchers, supra note 173, at 102-03.
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to ensure that the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to defend herself in court, a personal jurisdiction doctrine designed
solely for this purpose will be of limited impact. Indeed, if the
purpose of personal jurisdiction is to deal with these cases of extreme inconvenience, there seems to be little reason to have a separate personal jurisdiction doctrine. Instead, it could be addressed
under traditional procedural due process doctrine. 175

B. Bias
Parties may also care about the choice of forum because they
believe a particular forum will be biased in favor of one side. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that this is the primary
factor in choosing a forum. 176 If there are no choice of forum
limitations, then the plaintiff has the unbridled ability to select a
forum biased in her favor.
The fact that a plaintiff may be able to choose a forum biased
in her favor does not mean that the federal courts should intervene
to prevent this choice. Of course, at some point, a particular forum
may be so biased and unfair that holding the litigation there violates
the traditional procedural due process principles. 177 As with the
problem of extreme inconvenience, 178 there would seem to be no
reason for separate personal jurisdiction doctrine to handle these
occasional problems concerning the fundamental fairness of the
adjudicatory process.
As for the more typical situation, there is simply no reason why
the federal courts should mandate that the litigation occur in a
forum likely to prefer one side rather than the other. For example,
one might have a personal jurisdiction rule that requires that all
suits be brought in the defendant's home state, or alternatively, that
prohibits suits being brought in the plaintiff's home state. The
175 This is essentially the approach that would be used in all federal question cases if
the proposed changes to F.R.C.P. 4 are adopted. Those changes would provide nation-wide
service of process in all federal question cases. See COMMITTEE ON RuLES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE jUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL
RuLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 15-16 (1989). The Advisory Committee notes that even with
nation-wide service of process, a defendant would still be protected by the due process clause
from having to litigate in a forum that was so inconvenient that the litigation violated "fair
play and substantial justice." Id. at 31.
17~ See Morris, supra note 169, at 601.
177 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123
U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279 (1975).
11a See supra text accompanying note 175.
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justification would be that this would prevent plaintiffs from being
able to sue in the state most likely to be biased in their favor. But
why should the federal courts prefer defendants over plaintiffs?
Indeed, if the federal courts were to intervene on grounds of limiting bias, the only justifiable rule would seem to be one that requires
all suits to be brought in states having absolutely nothing to do with
the controversy or either party, because those states are the most
likely to be neutral.
There is an alternative justification for personal jurisdiction
that is related to the question of bias. It focuses not on the forum
selected, but on the process of selection. The argument would be
that it is unfair for plaintiffs to have unbridled ability to choose any
forum. 179 Our adversarial system is premised on the idea that the
two litigants should be in relatively equal positions. 180 Thus, for
example, a system that allowed the plaintiff to designate the judge,
with no input from the defendant, is so unbalanced in its treatment
of plaintiffs and defendants that it seems fundamentally unfair. 181
On the other hand, a more balanced and fair judge selection system
might be one that permitted the defendant to designate several
judges and then permitted the plaintiff to choose a forum among
that list.
Personal jurisdiction could be conceived of as a way of making
the process of selecting the forum somewhat more balanced and
fair by limiting the pool of places from which a plaintiff could pick.
The question remains, however, as to why the federal courts should
take it upon themselves to do this.
Although -intervention might be justified under the due
process 182 or equal protection clauses, 183 I think a more promising
source of authority would be the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution. 184 The Supreme Court has interpreted

(
179

See Gottlieb, suprc; pote H(, at 1327 (observing that plaintiffs, unlike defendants, have
the time to consider wh'ere to file suit).
180 See Mashaw, The Sup;-eme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 52
(I976).
181 See Stein, supra note I9, at 759.
182 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § I; see Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx.
L. REv. 579, 588 (1984).
183 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ I; see Leubsdorf, supra note I82, at 588-90.
184 U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1. Professor Trangsrud has similarly argued that the federal
standard for federal jurisdiction derives from the Full Faith and Credit Act. See Trangsrud,
supra note 23, at 858. He observes, and I agree, that if there were no limit on state jurisdic·
tiona) authority, states might expand their jurisdictional reach. See id. at 863. I also agree
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the full faith and credit clause and its implementing legislation 185
to require that a judgment from one state be given conclusive effect
in all other states. 186
Although commentators have questioned the correctness of this
interpretation, 187 it remains embedded in our law. If this interpretation were extended to mean that all judgments must be enforced,
at least all judgments that were valid in the rendering forum, this
would have the effect of expanding plaintiffs' choices of forum over
the choices that would otherwise exist. In a system in which states
are not required to and do not always enforce judgments of other
that such an expansion would not be restrained if jurisdiction were judged only by the law
of the rendering jurisdiction and that allowing the enforcing state to apply its law would be
unwise. However, as discussed below, I do not agree that a federal standard is necessary to
prevent what Trangsrud calls "exorbitant" exercises of jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction by
states that are insufficiently connected to the defendant.
The core of his argument about federal common law is the assertion that "[i)t is most
unlikely that the Framers or the First Congress intended that there be no check on the
assertion of exorbitant theories of jurisdiction by particular states." See id. at 863. There are
several problems with this argument. First, he cites no evidence that anyone actually perceived
"exorbitant" jurisdiction to be a problem and he even notes the "dissatisfaction with unreasonable claims of jurisdiction over noncitizens seems to have played little role in the disaffection many came to feel for the structure created by the Articles [of Confederation]." I d.
at 858 (footnote omitted). Moreover, it is not clear that there was a consensus about what
would constitute exorbitant jurisdiction. For example, Trangsrud cites Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1
Kirby 119 (Conn. 1786), and Phelps v. Holker, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 261 (1788), as examples of
situations in which one state unreasonably asserted jurisdiction and another state refused to
enforce the judgment. See Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 858 & n.50. But these cases also
demonstrate disagreement about what constituted reasonable exercises ofjurisdiction because
the rendering states in those cases presumably considered their conduct completely legitimate.
Finally, even if the Framers thought it important that the federal government limit state
power to assert "exorbitant" jurisdiction, it does not necessarily follow that they envisioned
direct limits on state jurisdiction. As discussed earlier, the Framers may have relied on the
privileges and immunities clause and diversity jurisdiction to solve the problem of "exorbitant" jurisdiction. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
In contrast to Transgrud, I am arguing for federal jurisdictional standards not because
it is inherently unreasonable for a state unconnected to the litigation to hear the case. Instead,
I argue that a process which gives plaintiffs complete and unfettered control over choice of
forum is unfair.
185 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat.
122 (1790)).
18 6 See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484-85 (1813). It is not clear whether
this holding rests on an interpretation of the constitutional provision or of the implementary
legislation. See Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court jurisdiction: A HistoricalInterpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14
CREIGHTON L. REv. 499, 568-70 (1981).
187 As Professor Maltz has observed, "the unity of the nation will not necessarily be
threatened if state A is allowed to render and enforce a judgment within its own borders,
but state B is not required to respect that judgment." Maltz, supra note 135, at 763; see also
Whitten, supra note 186, at 567.
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states, a plaintiff's forum options are likely, as a practical matter, to
be somewhat constrained. Under such a system, the plaintiff would
consider the fora in which enforcement would likely be sought and
then would bring the original law suit only in a forum where the
likely enforcing fora would respect the resulting judgment. 188 A
requirement that all sister-state judgments be enforced would have
significantly changed the situation. One might argue that such a
change was the intended effect of the full faith and credit clause. 189
There is little reason to believe, however, that the framers intended
the delphic words "full faith and credit" to have that effect. 190 The
purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to guard against "the
disintegrating influence of provincialism in jurisprudence," 191 but
this purpose does not depend on plaintiffs having unlimited choices
of forum.
One might, of course, accept that limiting plaintiffs' choices of
fora is sensible and consistent with the full faith and credit clause,
yet also argue that such a step is for Congress, not the courts.
Indeed, Article IV explicitly gives Congress the task of implementing the full faith and credit clause. Congress has in fact passed
implementing legislation, but that legislation does not explicitly address personal jurisdiction. 192 Thus, the Court must decide whether
the full faith and credit clause requires that all judgments be enforced, and includes no requirement concerning enforcement of
188 This was in fact precisely the situation that existed in the American colonies before
the Revolution. See Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 854-55.
189 Such a holding would not be inconsistent with the long accepted principle that a
state need only give effect to a judgment rendered by a court with jurisdiction. See Jackson,
Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyers Clause of the Constitution, 45 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1945);
Trangsrud, supra note 35, at 862-63. The enforcing state could rely entirely on the law of
the rendering state to determine whether there was jurisdiction. However, once a state knew
that any judgments valid under its own law would be enforced, it might expand its courts'
jurisdiction and thereby expand plaintiffs' forum options.
190 The clause generated little debate in the ratification process. See Sumner, The Full·
Faith-and-Credit-Clause-Its History and Purpose, 34 OR. L. REv. 224, 230 (1955). The clause
generated only brief mention in The Federalist Papers. Madison simply observes that the
provision of the clause giving power to Congress was a "valuable improvement" over the full
faith and credit clause of the Articles of Confederation because "[t]he meaning of the latter
is extremely indeterminate and can be of little importance under any interpretation which it
will bear." THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 271 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). For a history
of the full faith and credit clause and implementing legislation, sec Nadclmann, Full Faith
and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 MICH. L. REv. 33, 34-62 (1957); Sumner, supra, at
225-41; and Whitten, supra note 186, at 542-70. For a discussion of the purposes of the full
faith and credit clause, see Sumner, supra, at 241-49.
191 Jackson, supra note 189, at 17; accord Martin, Constitutional Limits on Choice of Law, 61
CoRNELL L. REv. 185, 193-94 (1976).
192 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
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judgments, or something in between. Assuming that the full faith
and credit clause is not absolute, some entity mus_t delineate rules
for determining when enforcement is required. In the absence of
congressional specification, it is appropriate for the federal courts
to elaborate the specifications. 193 These court-made rules can be
conceived of as a kind of "dormant" full and credit clause doctrine
or as federal common law 194 made pursuant to the full faith and
credit statute. 195
Assuming the authority for federal intervention exists, what
should the personal jurisdiction rules look like? Personal jurisdiction
could be conceived of as a variation of the previously described
judge-selecting scheme. By her conduct, the defendant chooses one
or more places where the litigation can be brought and the plaintiff
then gets to choose from among that list. The difficulty is that for
the reasons discussed earlier, 196 the defendant is unlikely to have
chosen anything. The defendant has not chosen the pool of possible
fora; the federal court's jurisdiction doctrine has. The question then
becomes whether there is any reason why some states should be on
the list of possible fora and not other states. Put differently, if the
goal is simply to limit the pool of possible fora from which a plaintiff
can pick, why not adopt some completely arbitrary rule such as the
plaintiff can sue in any state that begins with the same letter as the
defendant's last name?
The reason such an arbitrary rule is not appropriate is that it
does not accommqdate legitimate state interests. 197 Any federal rule
limiting where a plaintiff can sue is a federal intrusion on state
19s

Professor Sumner has noted:

As a practical matter the full faith and credit demanded by the Constitution is

that which the Supreme Court specifies. There is nothing whatsoever in the
history of the clause showing that this was the design of the framers. But, since
the clause is self-executing . . . and since Congress has failed to carry out its
task, there is little more that can be done.
Sumner, supra note 190, at 241.
19-1 See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957)
(holding that the jurisdictional provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, regulating labor unions,
was an invitation to the federal courts to fashion federal common law in the labor area).
195 See Abrams & Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court
jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REv. 69, 94 (1984). Another option to federal court-made rules
would be to permit the enforcing state to apply its own standards of validity. However, this
would sacrifice uniformity, see Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 864-65, something that was a
concern of the full faith and credit clause, see Sumner, supra note 190, at 246.
196 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
197 For arguments concerning the need for judicial restraint in the "dormant" commerce
clause, see Redish & Nugent, The Donnant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of
Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 592-99; Tushnet, supra note 113, at 150-56.
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power. States have significant and legitimate reasons for providing
a forum and, as a matter of federalism, any federal limit on choice
of forum should accommodate these reasons. 19 8
There are two categories of states that have legitimate interests
in providing a forum. The first category is states in which any
significant events, omissions or effects occurred. A state has a legitimate regulatory interest in providing a forum where it is the locus
of the liability-producing conduct. 199 But a state would seem also to
have a legitimate interest in providing a forum whenever it is the
place of injury. 200 Injuries have ramifications beyond the people
immediately affected. In World-Wide Volkswagen, for example, the
plaintiff's car blew up on an Oklahoma road. 201 Such an accident
may well threaten the safety of passers-by and rescue workers as
well as interfere with traffic. 202 Local residents have a legitimate
interest in knowing the cause of such an accident and likewise have
an interest in providing a forum for disputes arising out of the
accident. 203
198 Professor Smit has set forth numerous reasons why a state might be interested in
providing a forum:
The State may be interested in creating a forum for its own litigants. It may be
interested in creating a local forum so that its Jaws can be properly applied. It
may be interested in controlling the actions of its nationals. It may be interested
in creating a forum that is convenient for resident witnesses. It may have an
interest in efficient administration ofjustice. And it may be interested in creating
a local forum for the adjudication of disputes that have an impact on the
economic and social life of the State.
Smit, supra note I36, at 35I-52 (footnotes omitted). I think that nearly all of these interests
would be accommodated under my proposed rule.
199 See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 23, at 86.
200 The Brussels Convention adopts a similar approach. The Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the Recognition ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 3, no. 3, I5 O.J.
EuR. CoMM. (No. L 299) 32 (I972) (entered into force Feb. I, I973) [hereinafter Brussels
Convention]. It provides that tort suits may be brought in the place of the "harmful event."
"Harmful event" has been interpreted by the European Court of Justice to include both the
place of the events giving rise to liability and the place where damage occurs. See Bier v.
Mines de Potasse D'Aisace S.A. [I976-8] E.C.R. I736, I743 (European Court of Justice
I976), reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAws 6I2 (I986).
201 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (I980).
202 Kay Robinson and her two children, the plaintiffs in World-Wide Volkswagen, were in
fact rescued from their burning car by two local residents. Tulsa World, Sept. 23, I977, at
I, col. I. Other local residents, apparently moved by the plight of the family, established the
Robinson Family Relief Fund. See Tulsa World, Sept. 24, I977, at DI, col. I.
203 Professor Brilmayer argues that states should not be permitted to assert personal
jurisdiction solely on the basis of effects within the state. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count,
supra note 23, at 95-96, I05-07. Her rejection of effects as a basis for jurisdiction, however,
is based entirely on a commerce clause type argument that this allowance of personal juris·
diction would allow states to impose costs on other states. See supra notes I22-30 and
accompanying text for discussion of this argument.
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I believe that a state also has a significant interest in providing
a forum whenever either disputant is a citizen of that state. 204 States
may be concerned not only with how disputes are resolved, 205 but
also that disputes are resolved peacefully and expeditiously. 206 A
state may view the presence of unresolved disputes within its population as a threat to public order and happiness. 2°7
204 See Maltz, Sovereign Authority, Fairness, and Personal jurisdiction: The Case for the Doctrine
of Transient jurisdiction, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 671, 688 (1988); Weintraub, supra note 18, at 524.
205 Brilmayer focuses exclusively on whether states have a legitimate regulatory interest
in the conduct in question. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 23, at 86. Thus, she
addresses the question of a state's interest in how a dispute is resolved but not a state's
interest in whether the dispute is resolved. See id.
206 See Twitchell, supra note 49, at 655 (noting that "[a] state's desire as a sovereign to
provide an orderly process for the adjudication of disputes is a rational basis for providing
a forum").
207 The nationality of the offender and the victim are accepted bases in international
law for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. See The Draft Convention on Research in
International Law of the Harvard Law School, jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. 435, 519-21, 573-77 (Supp. 1935). Professor Stein has asserted that "[s]overeignty
is not a generalized charter to protect a state's domiciliaries around the world," Stein, supra
note 19, at 743, and the United States has in the past expressed hostility towards a theory of
"passive personality" under which jurisdiction is based on the citizenship of the victim. See
Note, Extraterritorial jurisdiction Over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 599, 603-06 (1987). Nonetheless,
in 1986 Congress acted in apparent reliance on the passive personality principle in adopting
legislation aimed at terrorism that makes it a crime to kill or endanger a United States
national abroad. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988); Note, supra, at 613-16. Moreover, courts have
held that the United States has authority to exercise jurisdiction on this basis, at least when
specifically authorized by statute. See United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir.
1984); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901-03 (D.D.C. 1988). Finally, as the United
States' justifications for its invasions of Grenada and the Dominion Republic demonstrate,
we have at times certainly acted as if we believed that our national sovereignty is a generalized
charter to protect our domiciliaries around the world. Concerning the invasion of Grenada,
see N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, § 1, at 16, col. 1 (quoting Pres. Reagan: "The United States
objectives are clear-to protect our own citizens ...."); N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, § 1, at
10, col. 5 (quoting Pres. Reagan: "I believe our government has a responsibility to go to the
aid of its citizens if their right to life and liberty is threatened."). Concerning the invasion of
the Dominican Republic, see N.Y. Times, May 3, 1965, at 10, col. 5 (quoting Pres. Johnson:
"Our forces, American forces, were ordered in immediately to protect American lives."). See
also Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902-03 (noting that the extradition to the United States of the
terrorist leader responsible for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the murder of Leon
Klinghoffer was justified solely on the basis of the citizenship of the victim).
There is no obvious reason to treat civil cases differently. In fact, commentators have
noted that a number of other countries recognize the nationality of the litigants as 1egitimate
bases of asserting jurisdiction. See, e.g., deVries & Lowenfeld,]urisdiction in Personal ActionsA Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44 IowA L. REv. 306,317 (1959); Rheinstein, The Constitutional
Bases ofJurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 797-99 (1955); Weser, Bases of]udicial]urisdiction
in the Common Market Countries, 10 AM. J. CoMP. L. 323, 324-27 (1961).
The Brussels Convention provides for jurisdiction at the defendant's domicile and, for
certain classes of plaintiffs, i.e., consumers, policyholders, and support claimants, at the
plaintiff's domicile. Brussels Convention, supra note 200, art. 2, 11 1 (defendant's domicile); id.
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In sum, I believe there is a plausible argument that allowing
plaintiffs an unlimited choice of forum violates the principle that
litigants should be in relatively equal positions. The full faith and
credit clause provides a basis for federal court intervention, but any
such intervention must be sensitive to legitimate state interests in
providing a forum.
C. Choice of Law
A final reason why litigants may care about choice of forum is
that it may have a significant, if not dispositive, effect on choice of
law. 208 The Supreme Court has given states wide latitude in the area
of choice of law209 and with the multitude of choice of law approaches,210 there may be significant variations in the law that would
be applied by different fora.
Numerous commentators have noted the relationship between
judicial jurisdiction and choice oflaw. 211 Several have proposed that
the two doctrines should be linked so that if there is jurisdiction
then the forum can apply its own law212 or if the forum can apply
its own law, then there is jurisdiction.213 However, most of the
commentators who have stressed the relationship between jurisdiction and choice of law assume that jurisdiction serves some function
independent of its effect on choice of law. 214 My suggestion here is
art. 14 (consumers); id. art. 8, ~ 2 (policyholders); id. art. 5, no. 2 (support claimants). See
generally Juenger, judicial jurisdiction in the United States and in the European Communities: A
Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1195 (1984).
208 See Peterson, Proposals of Marriage Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 869, 872 (1981). In some cases, it has been obvious that the plaintiff's choice
of forum was influenced by choice of law considerations. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110
S. Ct. 1274, 1277-78 (1990); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773 & n.1
(1984).
209 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co., v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-19 (1981) (Brennan, J.); id.
at 362 (Stevens, J., concurring); R. SEDLER, AcRoss STATE LINES 108 (1989).
210 See Kay, Theory into Practice: Choices of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv. 521
(1983).
211 See, e.g., Hill, Choice of Law and jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 CoLUl\1. L. REv.
960, 993 (1981); Martin, Personal jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L.REv. 872, 874
(1980); Peterson, jurisdiction and Choice ofLaw Revisited, 59 U. CoLO. L. REv. 37, 38-40 (1988);
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 33, 79-90 (1978); Weinberg,
The Place of the Trial and the Law Applied: Overhauling Constitutional Theory, 59 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 67, 97-99 (1988).
212 See Sedler, judicial jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner,
63 IowA L. REv. 1031, 1033 (1978).
2 " See Silberman, supra note 211, at 88.
214 See Hay, judicial jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Constitutional Limitations, 59 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 9, 9-10, 34 (1988); Maltz, supra note 204, at 700; Peterson, supra note 208, at 884;
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that personal jurisdiction can be treated as not merely related to
choice of law, but a doctrine whose sole purpose is to keep cases
out of states that would not be permitted to apply their own law.
This argument is of course premised on the view that some
constitutional limits of choice of law are appropriate. Although I
have argued in this article that most justifications for limiting judicial jurisdiction do not withstand scrutiny, I do not believe the same
is true for choice of law. It is beyond the scope of this article to
analyze this proposition fully, but I would simply note that it is far
more important to people structuring their conduct to know what
law will apply than it is to know where they might be sued.2 15
Assuming it is appropriate to impose federal limits on choice
of law, why use jurisdiction to accomplish this? Why not deal with
choice of law direcdy by permitting any state to be a forum but,
where necessary, prohibiting it from applying its law? There are
two reasons why it is appropriate to prohibit a state from hearing
a case if it is insufficiently connected to be able to apply its own law.
The first reason derives from legal realism. 216 A court that
"applies" another state's law is in fact applying its own interpretation
of some other law and thereby applies its law. There is no reason
why a state that is insufficiently connected to a case to apply its law
should be allowed to apply its "interpretation" of law. 217
The second reason why it is sensible to limit choice of forum
so as to limit choice of law stems from the Supreme Court's holding
in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman. 218 In Wortman, the Court held that a
forum may constitutionally apply its own procedures, including its
statute of limitations. Although some might criticize that decision
as simply wrong, 219 I think it correcdy embodies the concern apPosnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the
"Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY LJ. 729, 819 (1981); Rosenberg, Foreword to the Colorado Symposium,
59 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1988); Weinberg, supra note 211, at 103.
215 As Professor Silberman has aptly observed: "To believe that a defendant's contacts
with the forum state should be stronger under the due process clause for jurisdictional
purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more concerned with where
he will be hanged than whether." Silberman, supra note 211, at 88.
216 See L. BRILMAYER, CoNFLICTS OF LAws: FouNDATIONS AND FuTURE DIRECTIONS 31,
34-36 (1991); see also Linkletter v. Waliker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-24 (1965); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1945); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
217 Moreover, where a state that is prohibited from applying its own laws is permitted
to be the forum and "interpret" the laws of other states, the Supreme Court may then have
to decide whether the interpretation is so extreme as to violate the constitution. See Sun Oil
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988).
218 486 u.s. 717 (1988).
219 In an article written several years before Wortman, Professor Martin criticized lower
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parent in the Erie cases220 that what it means to be a forum is to
have the right to apply your own procedures. Within the federal
system, the power to create the courts carries with it the authority
to proscribe the rules of procedure for those courts. 221 The Supreme Court has held that this power to extend to all matters
"rationally capable of classification" as procedural. 222 Wortman simply extends that same broad control to states. It is less intrusive on
states for the federal courts to prohibit a state altogether from
hearing a case than it is to permit it to hear the case but pick and
choose among the procedures that states can apply.
If one treats jurisdiction as the handmaiden of choice of law
whose function is to implement choice of law concerns, that does
not necessarily mean that the test for jurisdiction should be identical
to the test developed in the choice of law area. Jurisdiction is a
preliminary matter and the standards for jurisdiction should be
relatively clear and straightforward. 223 Personal jurisdiction can be
treated as simply a first cut at dealing with choice of law problems
and an admittedly imperfect one.
With respect to choice of law, the Supreme Court has held that
a state may apply its laws where it has a "significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts" with the claims creating state
interests. 224 Contacts that the Court has considered relevant in creating state interests are the connection of the parties to a state2 25
and the place where conduct or injuries occurred. 226 Therefore, a
possible test might be one similar to the approach suggested earlier
in connection with the discussion of bias. 2 27
If personal jurisdiction is a tool for implementing choice of law
doctrine, then the goal of a personal jurisdiction test would be to
court cases that allowed the forum to apply its statute of limitations in situations similar to
Wortman. Martin, Statutes of Limitations and Rationality in Conflict of Laws, 19 WASHBURN L.
REv. 405, 415-21 (1980).
220 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64,92 (1938) (Reed,J., concurring).
221 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72; Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv.
693, 706 & n.77 (1974).
222 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
225 As Professor Borchers has aptly observed, "[i]t is bad enough to tell the Robinsons
· and Heitners of the world that their suit cannot be brought in the the most logical and
sensible forum, it is worse yet to tell them so only after three levels of appellate review, with
the result flipping back and forth as each new court reviews the case." Borchers, supra note
173, at 102.
224 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985).
225 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-19 (1981).
226 See Watson v. Employees Liability Assurance Co., 348 U.S. 66, 70-73 (1954).
227 See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
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eliminate as possible fora any state that was obviously unconnected
to the parties or the events. After the case was underway in a forum,
a more refined choice of law analysis could be made. One might
still conclude that a forum could not apply its law. But I am not
proposing that jurisdiction be treated as a complete solution to
choice of law problems, only that a well-constructed and straightforward personal jurisdiction rule can be a useful tool for reducing
unnecessary choice of law problems.

IV.

CoNCLUSION

A coherent doctrine of personal jurisdiction requires a clear
understanding of the purposes underlying the doctrine. The Supreme Court has never clearly articulated these underlying purposes, but the cases hint, and a growing chorus of commentators
explicitly argue, that personal jurisdiction is best understood as a
concrete manifestation of the philosophical problem of political
obligation and legitimacy. This view has led some commentators to
argue that personal jurisdiction should either explicitly incorporate
concepts derived from political philosophy or implicitly incorporate
such concepts by relying on approaches derived from the dormant
commerce clause. Unfortunately, neither political philosophy nor
the dormant commerce clause provides an adequate justification for
personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Nonetheless, I have argued that there may be one or more
problems for which personal jurisdiction is the solution. I have
focused on practical problems created by a plaintiff having unlimited choices of fora and suggested that some of these may be problems of sufficient magnitude that it is appropriate to solve them
through federal court-imposed limitations on choice of forum. I
have attempted to describe preliminarily what a doctrine centered
on these problems might look like. My goal is not to detail definitively a new test for jurisdiction but to describe the proper approach
to formulating such a test. The central premise of my approach is
that a coherent doctrine is not possible without first identifying the
problem for which personal jurisdiction is the solution. We either
have to let the beetle out of the box or stop talking about it. 228
228 If we do not do this, we may find ourselves in the chaos best described by Dr. Seuss.
T.S. GErSSEL, Fox IN SocKS 54 (1965) ("When beetles fight these battles in a bottle with their
paddles....").

